Connect with us

NEWS

The world’s great powers – like Soviets, Brits & Americans – have been chased out of Afghanistan… so why do outsiders keep trying?

Published

on

“Never.” Or “ni-kog-da” in Russian. That’s the stark verdict of a Soviet intelligence officer, trying to explain the record of foreigners conquering the shifting sands of Afghanistan. In history, they have never really succeeded.

The scene comes from the 2005 film, ‘The Ninth Company’, possibly the most popular film about the bloody and ill-fated Soviet war against the Mujahideen in the Central Asian nation. And yet, it’s a lesson that officials in the US Pentagon seem to have missed.

Perhaps “never” is an exaggeration: Alexander the Great’s ghost, for instance, might disagree. Although, back then then, it wasn’t really Afghanistan yet, and conquest also meant something very different.

The facts remain that, in recent history, great powers, with staggering resources and supreme self-confidence – from the British Empire to the Soviet Union and now the US – have failed to subdue one of the poorest countries on earth, with a smaller population than California.

In ‘The Ninth Company’, the intelligence officer, played as a brilliant study in repressed rage and stoicism by Aleksei Serebryakov of ‘Leviathan’ fame, turns out to be a perfect Cassandra, blessed with foresight but cursed by being ignored. At the unhappy end, all his listeners are dead, killed in an absurdly unnecessary battle. All except one single survivor, as happened to the British in 1842, who joins the Soviet retreat in 1989 to tell a tale he himself cannot understand.

And now it is 2021. A mere third of a century – well within the lifespan of a human being – after the Soviet fiasco, we are witnessing the US limping away in defeat as well.

It is a defeat when the invading power, this time the Americans, leaves the battlefield, while the enemy, now the Taliban, surge, clearly poised to finish off the client government if they so wish, with or without a “decent interval.”

The only powers they might possibly consider when planning their advance are – oh, irony! – Russia and China.
A bloody history

If Europe’s infamous 30 Years’ War seems long, for Afghans, wars and civil wars have now continued, with only minor and fragile pauses, for almost half a century.

By 2017, 70% of them were born during this over-forty-year-war-already-and-counting period. Thanks to the common efforts of warring insiders and outsiders, the majority of Afghans have no personal memory of sustained, reliable peace. Instead, war is the default. Let that sink in.

Those are the lucky ones. The others are dead. How many Afghans have died during this time? We don’t know precisely. For the Soviet war, almost every estimate exceeds 1 million, with some historians saying far more. Of these dead, the vast majority were civilians.

For the American war, the figure of 100,000 recently quoted in a lazily fact-checked BBC article by William Dalrymple is certainly a misleading – and telling – under-estimate.

Instead, according to the Cost of War Project at Brown University, the total of casualties in Afghanistan during this period exceeds 170,000.

Moreover, to be realistic, you have to add the dead from Pakistan as well, which results in a total of close to a quarter-million. These figures include “only” several thousand Americans and other outside forces. They also include large shares of civilians, 71,000 Afghans and Pakistanis.

Of course, many of these victims were killed not by the Western invaders but by local factions and fighters. That is no reason for complacency: first, because the West bears special responsibility for the general escalation, and second, because its troops – and those of its client government – have also killed civilians, including deliberately and in ways that qualify as war crimes. Even if they go unprosecuted.

As Human Rights Watch has recently found, “the primary and defining characteristic of the armed conflict in Afghanistan over the last two decades has been harm to civilians caused by massive human rights abuses and war crimes by all sides.”

It is especially important to be clear about these civilian victims because reckless interventionism, most recently by the West, has been accompanied by systematic “re-legitimation of war” propaganda. This means sanitizing violence by downplaying the scale of civilian suffering.

Adding up casualty figures shows a difference in orders of magnitude this time around. Clearly, the numbers are not the same in Afghanistan’s Soviet action and in America’s wars. Equally clearly, this can be no reason for Western complacency either: 71,000 dead civilians remains 71,000 too many. It would be morally perverse to think this latest incursion was more acceptable than previous ones because nominally fewer people in the shattered nation died needlessly.

Moreover, the dead of Afghanistan and Pakistan are, of course, only a part (and not the largest) of all the casualties of what some researchers call the “Post-9/11 Wars” – a string of disastrous Western interventions in the Middle East.

Finally, keep in mind that those killed directly are just a small part of those traumatized and deprived by war. These include the hurt and maimed – in body, mind, and soul, millions of displaced and refugees, those deprived of food, infrastructure and simply a little normality, and – with warfare on this scale and duration – those not born as well.
What war leaves behind

The vocal opposition of international institutions seems to make no difference to the prospect of war. The Soviets waged their Afghan invasion essentially as international outcasts. The US, however, managed to cajole and entice support from NATO and the UN. And yet, the result is the same.

The Soviets started their full invasion at the end of 1979 and left not quite 10 years later in early 1989. The US (with allies, international and local, who had little influence regarding key decisions) arrived in the fall of 2001 and took 20 years to leave. Both initially planned to exit much more quickly.

Putting aside the ideological rhetoric, neither the Soviets nor the Americans reached their real, essentially identical, war aims. These were effectively stabilizing a friendly, if very difficult, client regime for reasons of homeland security, geopolitics and, especially once you’re in too deep, prestige.

Both indulged in the common hubris of believing that another country’s internal conflict could be controlled and settled by outsiders. Maybe such things can happen in some places in the world. That it cannot work in Afghanistan is a proven fact.

Likewise, the Soviets and the Americans left, or are leaving, behind a situation that is worse than when they arrived.

Domestically, in the Soviet case, Afghanistan was already in a post-revolutionary civil war before the Soviet invasion and had more civil war after it, with more and better arms and much additional radicalization.

At the time of the American invasion, Afghanistan was in a state between comparatively low-level civil war and de facto peace, if under an atrocious Taliban regime. Now the successors to that regime are poised to either fully take over again or, at least, play a decisive role. Civil war is, long or short, of course, always an option on the horizon.

Internationally, the Soviet invasion made worse what Afghanistan has been cursed with: its location at the crossroads of great powers, on a volatile geopolitical fault line, continually attracting the interests and fears of other, stronger countries, near and far.

The same, again, is true for the American intervention. We can already see concentric circles of outside interests and fears spreading again, from Tajikistan to Russia, China and beyond. Nothing is settled, many are alarmed, some sense opportunities.

The Soviet attack – in part possibly triggered, against initial Kremlin reluctance, by fears that Afghanistan might switch sides to the US – intensified or provoked Pakistani, American, British, Saudi, Chinese and Iranian meddling. This meddling, lest we forget, included supporting foreign volunteers entering the fray against the Soviets, some of whom went on to attack the US, abroad and at home, leading to its own invasion in 2001.
Lessons to learn?

In the Soviet case, the defeat in Afghanistan has sometimes been seen as contributing to the collapse of the USSR – in an ultimate tale of backlash. This is probably an exaggeration, and there are no signs that the US, resolutely insulated against ever really reckoning with its own errors, is about to fall apart.

And yet, it would be fair to ask whether that American ability to take bloody fiascos on the chin and move on to another part of the world, instead of learning from them, is really a sign of strength.

Like this story? Share it with a friend!

NEWS

China is raising its retirement age, now among the youngest in the world’s major economies

Published

on

Starting next year, China will raise its retirement age for workers, which is now among the youngest in the world’s major economies, in an effort to address its shrinking population and aging work force.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature, passed the new policy Friday after a sudden announcement earlier in the week that it was reviewing the measure, state broadcaster CCTV announced.

The policy change will be carried out over 15 years, with the retirement age for men raised to 63 years, and for women to 55 or 58 years depending on their jobs. The current retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs and 55 for women doing white-collar work.

“We have more people coming into the retirement age, and so the pension fund is (facing) high pressure. That’s why I think it’s now time to act seriously,” said Xiujian Peng, a senior research fellow at Victoria University in Australia who studies China’s population and its ties to the economy.

The previous retirement ages were set in the 1950’s, when life expectancy was only around 40 years, Peng said.

The policy will be implemented starting in January, according to the announcement from China’s legislature. The change will take effect progressively based on people’s birthdates.

For example, a man born in January 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 7 months in August 2032, according to a chart released along with the policy. A man born in May 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 8 months in January 2033.

Demographic pressures made the move long overdue, experts say. By the end of 2023, China counted nearly 300 million people over the age of 60. By 2035, that figure is projected to be 400 million, larger than the population of the U.S. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had previously projected that the public pension fund will run out of money by that year.

Pressure on social benefits such as pensions and social security is hardly a China-specific problem. The U.S. also faces the issue as analysis shows that currently, the Social Security fund won’t be able to pay out full benefits to people by 2033.

“This is happening everywhere,” said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But in China with its large elderly population, the challenge is much larger.”

That is on top of fewer births, as younger people opt out of having children, citing high costs. In 2022, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for the first time the country had 850,000 fewer people at the end of the year than the previous year , a turning point from population growth to decline. In 2023, the population shrank further, by 2 million people.

What that means is that the burden of funding elderly people’s pensions will be divided among a smaller group of younger workers, as pension payments are largely funded by deductions from people who are currently working.

Researchers measure that pressure by looking at a number called the dependency ratio, which counts the number of people over the age of 65 compared to the number of workers under 65. That number was 21.8% in 2022, according to government statistics, meaning that roughly five workers would support one retiree. The percentage is expected to rise, meaning fewer workers will be shouldering the burden of one retiree.

The necessary course correction will cause short-term pain, experts say, coming at a time of already high youth unemployment and a soft economy.

A 52-year-old Beijing resident, who gave his family name as Lu and will now retire at age 61 instead of 60, was positive about the change. “I view this as a good thing, because our society’s getting older, and in developed countries, the retirement age is higher,” he said.

Li Bin, 35, who works in the event planning industry, said she was a bit sad.

“It’s three years less of play time. I had originally planned to travel around after retirement,” she said. But she said it was better than expected because the retirement age was only raised three years for women in white-collar jobs.

Some of the comments on social media when the policy review was announced earlier in the week reflected anxiety.

But of the 13,000 comments on the Xinhua news post announcing the news, only a few dozen were visible, suggesting that many others had been censored.

Continue Reading

NEWS

Russia warns NATO of ‘direct war’ over Ukraine

Published

on

Moscow’s envoy to the UN has reiterated where the Kremlin’s red line is

Granting Kiev permission to use Western-supplied long-range weapons would constitute direct involvement in the Ukraine conflict by NATO, Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, has said.

Moscow will treat any such attack as coming from the US and its allies directly, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday, explaining that long-range weapons rely on Western intelligence and targeting solutions, neither of which Ukraine is capable of.

NATO countries would “start an open war” with Russia if they allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons, Nebenzia told the UN Security Council on Friday.

“If such a decision is made, that means NATO countries are starting an open war against Russia,” Moscow’s envoy said. “In that case, we will obviously be forced to make certain decisions, with all the attendant consequences for Western aggressors.”

Putin issues new warning to NATO

“Our Western colleagues will not be able to dodge responsibility and blame Kiev for everything,” Nebenzia added. “Only NATO troops can program the flight solutions for those missile systems. Ukraine doesn’t have that capability. This is not about allowing Kiev to strike Russia with long-range weapons, but about the West making the targeting decisions.”

Russia considers it irrelevant that Ukrainian nationalists would technically be the ones pulling the trigger, Nebenzia explained. “NATO would become directly involved in military action against a nuclear power. I don’t think I have to explain what consequences that would have,” he said.

The US and its allies placed some restrictions on the use of their weapons, so they could claim not to be directly involved in the conflict with Russia, while arming Ukraine to the tune of $200 billion.

Multiple Western outlets have reported that the limitations might be lifted this week, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Kiev. Russia has repeatedly warned the West against such a course of action.

 

Continue Reading

NEWS

China makes its move in Africa. Should the West be worried?

Published

on

Beijing maintains a conservative economic agenda in its relations with the continent, while finding it increasingly difficult to avoid a political confrontation with the West

The ninth forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit held in Beijing on September 4-6 marked a significant phase in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-Covid era. China is the last major partner to hold a summit with African nations following the end of the pandemic; Africa summits were held by the EU and the US in 2022, and by Russia in 2023. The pandemic, coupled with rising global tensions, macroeconomic shifts, and a series of crises, underlined Africa’s growing role in the global economy and politics – something that China, which has undergone major changes (both internal and external) as a result of the pandemic, is well aware of.

It is clear that the relationship between China and Africa is entering a new phase. China is no longer just a preferential economic partner for Africa, as it had been in the first two decades of the 21st century. It has become a key political and military ally for many African countries. This is evident from China’s increasing role in training African civil servants and sharing expertise with them, as well as from several initiatives announced at the summit, including military-technical cooperation: officer training programs, mine clearing efforts, and over $100 million which China will provide to support the armed forces of African nations.

In the political arena, however, Beijing is proceeding very cautiously and the above-mentioned initiatives should be seen as the first tentative attempts rather than a systematic strategy.

While China strives to avoid political confrontation with the West in Africa and even closely cooperates with it on certain issues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. Washington is determined to pursue a policy of confrontation with Beijing in Africa – this is evident both from US rhetoric and its strategic documents.

Dirty tactics: How the US tries to break China’s soft power in Africa

A “divorce” between China and the West is almost inevitable. This means that Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations and won’t have access to transportation and logistics infrastructure. Consequently, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global power centers.

An important sign of the growing confrontation between the US and China in Africa was the signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia regarding the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was originally built by China in the 1970s. If it is expanded, electrified, and modernized, TAZARA has the potential to become a viable alternative to one of the key US investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor, which aims to enhance logistics infrastructure for exporting minerals (copper and cobalt) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia by modernizing the railway from the DR Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In inland regions such as Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of mineral extraction. Considering the region’s shortage of rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway line leading to a port in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean can significantly boost the operation of the mining sector and permanently tie the extraction and processing regions to specific markets.

It appears that China’s initiative holds greater promise compared to the US one, particularly because Chinese companies control major mines both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This gives them a clear advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment, facilitating the export of minerals through East African ports. Overall, this indicates that East Africa will maintain its role as the economic leader on the continent and one of the most integrated and rapidly developing regions for imports.

A former colonial European power returns to Africa. What is it after now?

The highlight of the summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion to African countries over the next three years (by 2027). This figure echoes the $55 billion commitment to China made by the US (for 3 years) at the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion that the EU promised to provide over seven years back in 2021. Consequently, leading global players allocate approximately $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

In recent years, there has been noticeable growth in such promises. Nearly every nation is eager to promise Africa something – for example, Italy has pledged $1 billion annually. However, these large packages of so-called “financial aid” often have little in common with actual assistance, since they are typically commercial loans or corporate investments. Moreover, a significant portion of these funds is spent in the donor countries (e.g. on the procurement and production of goods), which means that they contribute to the economic growth of African nations in a minimal way.

As for China, it will provide about $11 billion in genuine aid. This is a substantial amount which will be used for developing healthcare and agriculture in Africa. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans (roughly $10 billion per year) and a further $10 billion as investments.

The overall financial framework allows us to make certain conclusions, though it’s important to note that the methodology for calculating these figures is unclear, and the line between loans, humanitarian aid, and investments remains blurred. In terms of investments (averaging around $3 billion per year), Beijing plans to maintain its previous levels of activity – in recent years, China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion annually. Financial and humanitarian aid could nearly double (from the current $1.5 billion-$2 billion per year) while lending is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels (which would still be below the peak years of 2012-2018).

Can Africa seize control of its own energy?

China’s economic plan for Africa seems to be quite conservative. It’s no surprise that debt issues took center stage during the summit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, macroeconomic stability in African countries deteriorated, which led to challenges in debt repayments and forced Africa to initiate debt restructuring processes assisted by the IMF and the G20. Starting in 2020, a combination of internal and external factors led China to significantly cut its lending to African countries – from about $10-15 billion down to $2-3 billion. This reduction in funding has triggered economic reforms in several African countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), which have shifted toward stricter tax and monetary policies. While promises to increase lending may seem like good news for African nations, it’s likely that much of this funding will go toward interest payments on existing obligations and debt restructuring, since China wants to ensure that its loans are repaid.

Despite China’s cautious approach to Africa, its interaction with the continent will develop as a result of external and internal changes affecting both Africa and China. Africa will gradually become more industrialized and will reduce imports while the demand for investments and local production will increase. China will face demographic challenges, and its workforce will decrease. This may encourage bilateral cooperation as some production facilities may move from China to Africa. This will most likely concern East African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, considering China’s current investments in their energy and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, with Africa’s population on the rise and China’s population declining, Beijing is expected to attract more African migrant workers to help address labor shortages.

Continue Reading

Trending