Connect with us

NEWS

Joe Biden’s Russia conundrum: Will the incoming US president work to relax tensions or double down on hostile approach to Moscow?

Published

on

US President-elect Joe Biden isn’t known in Russia for his warm words, slamming the country as an “opponent” and its leader as “a KGB thug.” In Moscow, the return to previous form in the White House will almost be a relief.

As the iconic ball-drop took place in New York’s empty Times Square on Thursday, it marked the approaching end of a torrid chapter in relations between Russia and the US. Some American politicians have spent years insisting that President Donald Trump’s shock 2016 victory was a result of plotting by the Kremlin. But, honestly, if they were right, Moscow should ask for its money back.

While the real estate mogul previously lavished praise on his Russian counterpart and called the country “really hot stuff,” in practice, diplomacy between the two has become distinctly frosty. Under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the State Department has overseen the collapse of a series of bilateral treaties that were designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

In 2019, Washington formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Cold War-era deal banned a whole host of ballistic missiles, as part of a package of measures created to avoid potential escalations like those seen in earlier decades, such as the 1960s Cuban Missile Crisis.

Then, in 2020, the US withdrawal from the Open Skies mutual surveillance treaty, which was designed to ease military tensions, reignited mistrust and fears of a fresh conflict.

Now, with the New START warhead reduction pact set to expire in February, the last remaining brake on the growth of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals could be removed. Russia has little interest in a costly arms race, particularly given how little return it would get from investing in warheads compared to, say, conventional weapons or its navy.

The Americans accuse Russia of violating the terms of treaties like Open Skies, but Moscow’s top diplomats deny wrongdoing, insisting that the US has made little effort to return to the table.

Biden has been critical of many of these decisions, saying that the unilateral withdrawal from the deal was a sign that “President Trump has doubled down on his short-sighted policy of going it alone and abandoning American leadership.”

Despite the former vice president’s sharp rhetoric on Russia, there are hopes in the country that it signals a return to a leader who thinks in Cold War-era terms, and understands the value of the systems put in place during the period. While rejoining and resurrecting many of the deals that his predecessor tore up will be a challenge, any effort by the new administration to reopen talks on arms control in 2021 would likely be received as a welcome sign of its intentions.

However, while there are opportunities to create goodwill and to turn around troubled US-Russian relations, there are also fears that Biden’s foreign policy doctrine will prevent him from taking advantage of them. Trump’s approach, albeit perceived by some as inconsistent and erratic, was defined by a ruthlessly pragmatic approach to strengthening American interests across the globe.

His warm, even friendly, photo opportunities with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un were a radical departure from rules laid by his predecessors about legitimizing hostile leaders, but ultimately have cooled tensions on the peninsula.

Biden’s camp has been clear that leaders like Kim won’t be able to expect that kind of special treatment when he takes over the reins, and that he will avoid cultivating a personal relationship with world figures deemed controversial in the US. Had Biden been in office since 2016, it is likely that the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be far worse as a result of that approach.

In contrast to Trump’s realpolitik, Biden is thought to put far more stock in a so-called ‘values based’ foreign policy. Through decades in the Senate, during a period defined by the collapse of Yugoslavia and the expansion of NATO into the Eastern Bloc, he has cultivated a clear sense of what he thinks are the ‘good guys versus bad guys.’ In his 2019 flagship foreign policy speech, Biden made it clear that he expected the US to “lead the democratic world” and promote democracy and American liberalism across the globe.

That approach risks damaging prospects for better ties with Russia, which insists that foreign policy should be driven not by values-driven considerations, but on the basis of agreed international law alone.

The country’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has repeatedly said that talks with the US on everything from trade to nuclear weapons would be welcome, as long as they are underpinned by “mutual respect” and an understanding of Russian strategic interests. The message is clear – American diplomats are welcome, but they must leave a hard approach to their ideology at the door.

If, when Biden takes his seat in the Oval Office, he takes the view of Russia as a rogue nation, or a problem to be fixed with further sanctions and attempts to isolate the country politically, it is hard to see how the result will be anything other than a further resurrection of Cold War tensions. If instead he works to cultivate ties, promote a return to bilateralism and ease away from presenting Russia as a threat to the public, the situation will thaw almost instantly. For now, at least, the ball is in Biden’s court.

Think your friends would be interested? Share this story!

NEWS

China is raising its retirement age, now among the youngest in the world’s major economies

Published

on

Starting next year, China will raise its retirement age for workers, which is now among the youngest in the world’s major economies, in an effort to address its shrinking population and aging work force.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature, passed the new policy Friday after a sudden announcement earlier in the week that it was reviewing the measure, state broadcaster CCTV announced.

The policy change will be carried out over 15 years, with the retirement age for men raised to 63 years, and for women to 55 or 58 years depending on their jobs. The current retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs and 55 for women doing white-collar work.

“We have more people coming into the retirement age, and so the pension fund is (facing) high pressure. That’s why I think it’s now time to act seriously,” said Xiujian Peng, a senior research fellow at Victoria University in Australia who studies China’s population and its ties to the economy.

The previous retirement ages were set in the 1950’s, when life expectancy was only around 40 years, Peng said.

The policy will be implemented starting in January, according to the announcement from China’s legislature. The change will take effect progressively based on people’s birthdates.

For example, a man born in January 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 7 months in August 2032, according to a chart released along with the policy. A man born in May 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 8 months in January 2033.

Demographic pressures made the move long overdue, experts say. By the end of 2023, China counted nearly 300 million people over the age of 60. By 2035, that figure is projected to be 400 million, larger than the population of the U.S. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had previously projected that the public pension fund will run out of money by that year.

Pressure on social benefits such as pensions and social security is hardly a China-specific problem. The U.S. also faces the issue as analysis shows that currently, the Social Security fund won’t be able to pay out full benefits to people by 2033.

“This is happening everywhere,” said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But in China with its large elderly population, the challenge is much larger.”

That is on top of fewer births, as younger people opt out of having children, citing high costs. In 2022, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for the first time the country had 850,000 fewer people at the end of the year than the previous year , a turning point from population growth to decline. In 2023, the population shrank further, by 2 million people.

What that means is that the burden of funding elderly people’s pensions will be divided among a smaller group of younger workers, as pension payments are largely funded by deductions from people who are currently working.

Researchers measure that pressure by looking at a number called the dependency ratio, which counts the number of people over the age of 65 compared to the number of workers under 65. That number was 21.8% in 2022, according to government statistics, meaning that roughly five workers would support one retiree. The percentage is expected to rise, meaning fewer workers will be shouldering the burden of one retiree.

The necessary course correction will cause short-term pain, experts say, coming at a time of already high youth unemployment and a soft economy.

A 52-year-old Beijing resident, who gave his family name as Lu and will now retire at age 61 instead of 60, was positive about the change. “I view this as a good thing, because our society’s getting older, and in developed countries, the retirement age is higher,” he said.

Li Bin, 35, who works in the event planning industry, said she was a bit sad.

“It’s three years less of play time. I had originally planned to travel around after retirement,” she said. But she said it was better than expected because the retirement age was only raised three years for women in white-collar jobs.

Some of the comments on social media when the policy review was announced earlier in the week reflected anxiety.

But of the 13,000 comments on the Xinhua news post announcing the news, only a few dozen were visible, suggesting that many others had been censored.

Continue Reading

NEWS

Russia warns NATO of ‘direct war’ over Ukraine

Published

on

Moscow’s envoy to the UN has reiterated where the Kremlin’s red line is

Granting Kiev permission to use Western-supplied long-range weapons would constitute direct involvement in the Ukraine conflict by NATO, Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, has said.

Moscow will treat any such attack as coming from the US and its allies directly, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday, explaining that long-range weapons rely on Western intelligence and targeting solutions, neither of which Ukraine is capable of.

NATO countries would “start an open war” with Russia if they allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons, Nebenzia told the UN Security Council on Friday.

“If such a decision is made, that means NATO countries are starting an open war against Russia,” Moscow’s envoy said. “In that case, we will obviously be forced to make certain decisions, with all the attendant consequences for Western aggressors.”

Putin issues new warning to NATO

“Our Western colleagues will not be able to dodge responsibility and blame Kiev for everything,” Nebenzia added. “Only NATO troops can program the flight solutions for those missile systems. Ukraine doesn’t have that capability. This is not about allowing Kiev to strike Russia with long-range weapons, but about the West making the targeting decisions.”

Russia considers it irrelevant that Ukrainian nationalists would technically be the ones pulling the trigger, Nebenzia explained. “NATO would become directly involved in military action against a nuclear power. I don’t think I have to explain what consequences that would have,” he said.

The US and its allies placed some restrictions on the use of their weapons, so they could claim not to be directly involved in the conflict with Russia, while arming Ukraine to the tune of $200 billion.

Multiple Western outlets have reported that the limitations might be lifted this week, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Kiev. Russia has repeatedly warned the West against such a course of action.

 

Continue Reading

NEWS

China makes its move in Africa. Should the West be worried?

Published

on

Beijing maintains a conservative economic agenda in its relations with the continent, while finding it increasingly difficult to avoid a political confrontation with the West

The ninth forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit held in Beijing on September 4-6 marked a significant phase in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-Covid era. China is the last major partner to hold a summit with African nations following the end of the pandemic; Africa summits were held by the EU and the US in 2022, and by Russia in 2023. The pandemic, coupled with rising global tensions, macroeconomic shifts, and a series of crises, underlined Africa’s growing role in the global economy and politics – something that China, which has undergone major changes (both internal and external) as a result of the pandemic, is well aware of.

It is clear that the relationship between China and Africa is entering a new phase. China is no longer just a preferential economic partner for Africa, as it had been in the first two decades of the 21st century. It has become a key political and military ally for many African countries. This is evident from China’s increasing role in training African civil servants and sharing expertise with them, as well as from several initiatives announced at the summit, including military-technical cooperation: officer training programs, mine clearing efforts, and over $100 million which China will provide to support the armed forces of African nations.

In the political arena, however, Beijing is proceeding very cautiously and the above-mentioned initiatives should be seen as the first tentative attempts rather than a systematic strategy.

While China strives to avoid political confrontation with the West in Africa and even closely cooperates with it on certain issues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. Washington is determined to pursue a policy of confrontation with Beijing in Africa – this is evident both from US rhetoric and its strategic documents.

Dirty tactics: How the US tries to break China’s soft power in Africa

A “divorce” between China and the West is almost inevitable. This means that Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations and won’t have access to transportation and logistics infrastructure. Consequently, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global power centers.

An important sign of the growing confrontation between the US and China in Africa was the signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia regarding the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was originally built by China in the 1970s. If it is expanded, electrified, and modernized, TAZARA has the potential to become a viable alternative to one of the key US investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor, which aims to enhance logistics infrastructure for exporting minerals (copper and cobalt) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia by modernizing the railway from the DR Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In inland regions such as Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of mineral extraction. Considering the region’s shortage of rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway line leading to a port in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean can significantly boost the operation of the mining sector and permanently tie the extraction and processing regions to specific markets.

It appears that China’s initiative holds greater promise compared to the US one, particularly because Chinese companies control major mines both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This gives them a clear advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment, facilitating the export of minerals through East African ports. Overall, this indicates that East Africa will maintain its role as the economic leader on the continent and one of the most integrated and rapidly developing regions for imports.

A former colonial European power returns to Africa. What is it after now?

The highlight of the summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion to African countries over the next three years (by 2027). This figure echoes the $55 billion commitment to China made by the US (for 3 years) at the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion that the EU promised to provide over seven years back in 2021. Consequently, leading global players allocate approximately $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

In recent years, there has been noticeable growth in such promises. Nearly every nation is eager to promise Africa something – for example, Italy has pledged $1 billion annually. However, these large packages of so-called “financial aid” often have little in common with actual assistance, since they are typically commercial loans or corporate investments. Moreover, a significant portion of these funds is spent in the donor countries (e.g. on the procurement and production of goods), which means that they contribute to the economic growth of African nations in a minimal way.

As for China, it will provide about $11 billion in genuine aid. This is a substantial amount which will be used for developing healthcare and agriculture in Africa. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans (roughly $10 billion per year) and a further $10 billion as investments.

The overall financial framework allows us to make certain conclusions, though it’s important to note that the methodology for calculating these figures is unclear, and the line between loans, humanitarian aid, and investments remains blurred. In terms of investments (averaging around $3 billion per year), Beijing plans to maintain its previous levels of activity – in recent years, China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion annually. Financial and humanitarian aid could nearly double (from the current $1.5 billion-$2 billion per year) while lending is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels (which would still be below the peak years of 2012-2018).

Can Africa seize control of its own energy?

China’s economic plan for Africa seems to be quite conservative. It’s no surprise that debt issues took center stage during the summit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, macroeconomic stability in African countries deteriorated, which led to challenges in debt repayments and forced Africa to initiate debt restructuring processes assisted by the IMF and the G20. Starting in 2020, a combination of internal and external factors led China to significantly cut its lending to African countries – from about $10-15 billion down to $2-3 billion. This reduction in funding has triggered economic reforms in several African countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), which have shifted toward stricter tax and monetary policies. While promises to increase lending may seem like good news for African nations, it’s likely that much of this funding will go toward interest payments on existing obligations and debt restructuring, since China wants to ensure that its loans are repaid.

Despite China’s cautious approach to Africa, its interaction with the continent will develop as a result of external and internal changes affecting both Africa and China. Africa will gradually become more industrialized and will reduce imports while the demand for investments and local production will increase. China will face demographic challenges, and its workforce will decrease. This may encourage bilateral cooperation as some production facilities may move from China to Africa. This will most likely concern East African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, considering China’s current investments in their energy and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, with Africa’s population on the rise and China’s population declining, Beijing is expected to attract more African migrant workers to help address labor shortages.

Continue Reading

Trending