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Russia & China’s partnership not only about ‘containing’ American aggression, also vital for creation of multi-polar world order

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It’s common for Western observers to dismiss the emerging strategic partnership between Russia and China as merely a “marriage of convenience” and a union excessively reliant on shared opposition to US foreign policy ambitions.
Russia and China: Strategic partnership or a marriage of convenience?

Thus, it’s expected that under the surface, centuries of distrust linger, and as China continues to grow, eventually, power rivalry and a “divorce” would follow.

Their common opposition to the US has indeed intensified the partnership, and historical distrust and power asymmetries between Russia and China must be managed. However, Beijing will not replace Washington as the nemesis of Moscow – instead Greater Eurasia is being organised as a multipolar region capable of accommodating Russia.

Russia’s vision of a multipolar order is not possible without a strong China. After the Western support for the 2014 Maidan coup in Ukraine, Russia ended its three-centuries-long Western-centric foreign policy and the post-Cold War ambition to integrate with the West. Russia replaced its ambition for Greater Europe with the Greater Eurasia Initiative that advanced economic integration on the supercontinent. At the centre of the Greater Eurasia Initiative is a strategic partnership with China.
The unipolar moment and continued containment of Russia

After the Cold War, the US embraced a security strategy based on world domination. This has been conceptualised benignly as a “liberal order” or “rules-based order” and common good for the world as stipulated by hegemonic stability theory. Yet, these terms and intentions neglect the underlying power considerations that perpetuate the containment of Russia.

 

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Less than two months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic Pentagon paper, the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG), was leaked, which outlined a security strategy based on global dominance. Security and stability relied on preventing the emergence of any possible future rivals. The DPG advocated for missile defence to undercut Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities, which lay the foundation for nuclear parity and stability, as Russia was identified as “the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States”. In 2002, the security strategy of global dominance was formalised in the US Security Strategy, as world peace was believed to depend on no foreign powers even having the ambition to rival the US. The first sentence of the recently de-classified Indo-Pacific strategy of the US similarly states “how to maintain US strategic primacy”.

A unipolar security strategy is dangerous as power maximisation becomes the ultimate objective, as opposed to security. Security through global dominance is dangerous as it creates incentives for conflicts to marginalise adversaries and maintain security dependence by allies. US strategic planners cynically view escalating tensions in the Himalayas as an opportunity to bring India into the US fold and to distract China from the South China Sea. The domineering role of the US in Europe has similarly relied on finding a raison d’etre for NATO after the Cold War, which is achieved as conflicts emerge from expanding the military alliance towards Russian borders. The hegemonic security architecture defends from security threats caused by its own existence.
Multipolar Greater Eurasia

Russia’s aim to establish a multipolar order is not possible without the rapidly ascending China. Moreover, the growing power of China will not destine the collapse of the Russian-Chinese partnership as a multipolar system creates incentives for China to accommodate Russia.

Russia and China have different visions for an integrated Greater Eurasia, yet there are incentives for harmonising interests, as neither format is possible without cooperation with the other. Subsequently, even though Chinese influence in Central Asia competes with Russian influence, Beijing makes great efforts to include Russian interests. This stands in contradiction to Western unipolar policies that explicitly aim to peel away Russia’s neighbours.

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Russia can accept that China is economically more powerful as a multipolar system balances itself. While an independent Russian role in Europe has been vehemently opposed by the West, an independent Russian foreign policy in Greater Eurasia enjoys wide support.

Other powers across the Greater Eurasian region share Moscow’s objective of preserving Russia as an independent pole of power in a multipolar system. The obvious motivation is to prevent Russia’s pivot to Asia from merely becoming a pivot to China.

Japan is reaching out to Russia to deepen economic connectivity, as excessive dependence on China will likely challenge Russia’s neutral stance in the China-Japan rivalry. India is similarly working towards greater economic connectivity with Russia to ensure that Beijing does not wield excessive influence over Moscow.

The West has similar incentives to accommodate Russia, although unipolar policies in a multipolar world result in self-harm.To be fair, both Germany and France have recognised that continuing to push Russia towards China will weaken Europe. Even the US has incentives to change course and cease hostilities: Washington could accommodate Russia in greater Europe and even support the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union to restrain Chinese influence in Central Asia. However, the endeavour to restore US unipolarity is instead driving its key adversaries together.
Greater Eurasia – not inherently an anti-American partnership

The US is confronted with a dilemma as its relative power declines. Washington can accommodate a multipolar world order and use its leverage to maintain its leadership as the “first among equals”. Alternatively, the US can attempt to prolong its domineering role by containing rising powers, although then the new institutions will be without US influence and in opposition to the US.

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The US has gone with the second option, which has predictably resulted in the Russia-China strategic partnership intensifying and taking on anti-American characteristics. Yet, the partnership is not dependent on anti-American sentiments. The changing international distribution necessitates Russia and China to deepen economic connectivity and construct institutions for a multipolar Greater Eurasian Region.

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China is raising its retirement age, now among the youngest in the world’s major economies

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Starting next year, China will raise its retirement age for workers, which is now among the youngest in the world’s major economies, in an effort to address its shrinking population and aging work force.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature, passed the new policy Friday after a sudden announcement earlier in the week that it was reviewing the measure, state broadcaster CCTV announced.

The policy change will be carried out over 15 years, with the retirement age for men raised to 63 years, and for women to 55 or 58 years depending on their jobs. The current retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs and 55 for women doing white-collar work.

“We have more people coming into the retirement age, and so the pension fund is (facing) high pressure. That’s why I think it’s now time to act seriously,” said Xiujian Peng, a senior research fellow at Victoria University in Australia who studies China’s population and its ties to the economy.

The previous retirement ages were set in the 1950’s, when life expectancy was only around 40 years, Peng said.

The policy will be implemented starting in January, according to the announcement from China’s legislature. The change will take effect progressively based on people’s birthdates.

For example, a man born in January 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 7 months in August 2032, according to a chart released along with the policy. A man born in May 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 8 months in January 2033.

Demographic pressures made the move long overdue, experts say. By the end of 2023, China counted nearly 300 million people over the age of 60. By 2035, that figure is projected to be 400 million, larger than the population of the U.S. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had previously projected that the public pension fund will run out of money by that year.

Pressure on social benefits such as pensions and social security is hardly a China-specific problem. The U.S. also faces the issue as analysis shows that currently, the Social Security fund won’t be able to pay out full benefits to people by 2033.

“This is happening everywhere,” said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But in China with its large elderly population, the challenge is much larger.”

That is on top of fewer births, as younger people opt out of having children, citing high costs. In 2022, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for the first time the country had 850,000 fewer people at the end of the year than the previous year , a turning point from population growth to decline. In 2023, the population shrank further, by 2 million people.

What that means is that the burden of funding elderly people’s pensions will be divided among a smaller group of younger workers, as pension payments are largely funded by deductions from people who are currently working.

Researchers measure that pressure by looking at a number called the dependency ratio, which counts the number of people over the age of 65 compared to the number of workers under 65. That number was 21.8% in 2022, according to government statistics, meaning that roughly five workers would support one retiree. The percentage is expected to rise, meaning fewer workers will be shouldering the burden of one retiree.

The necessary course correction will cause short-term pain, experts say, coming at a time of already high youth unemployment and a soft economy.

A 52-year-old Beijing resident, who gave his family name as Lu and will now retire at age 61 instead of 60, was positive about the change. “I view this as a good thing, because our society’s getting older, and in developed countries, the retirement age is higher,” he said.

Li Bin, 35, who works in the event planning industry, said she was a bit sad.

“It’s three years less of play time. I had originally planned to travel around after retirement,” she said. But she said it was better than expected because the retirement age was only raised three years for women in white-collar jobs.

Some of the comments on social media when the policy review was announced earlier in the week reflected anxiety.

But of the 13,000 comments on the Xinhua news post announcing the news, only a few dozen were visible, suggesting that many others had been censored.

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Russia warns NATO of ‘direct war’ over Ukraine

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Moscow’s envoy to the UN has reiterated where the Kremlin’s red line is

Granting Kiev permission to use Western-supplied long-range weapons would constitute direct involvement in the Ukraine conflict by NATO, Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, has said.

Moscow will treat any such attack as coming from the US and its allies directly, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday, explaining that long-range weapons rely on Western intelligence and targeting solutions, neither of which Ukraine is capable of.

NATO countries would “start an open war” with Russia if they allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons, Nebenzia told the UN Security Council on Friday.

“If such a decision is made, that means NATO countries are starting an open war against Russia,” Moscow’s envoy said. “In that case, we will obviously be forced to make certain decisions, with all the attendant consequences for Western aggressors.”

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“Our Western colleagues will not be able to dodge responsibility and blame Kiev for everything,” Nebenzia added. “Only NATO troops can program the flight solutions for those missile systems. Ukraine doesn’t have that capability. This is not about allowing Kiev to strike Russia with long-range weapons, but about the West making the targeting decisions.”

Russia considers it irrelevant that Ukrainian nationalists would technically be the ones pulling the trigger, Nebenzia explained. “NATO would become directly involved in military action against a nuclear power. I don’t think I have to explain what consequences that would have,” he said.

The US and its allies placed some restrictions on the use of their weapons, so they could claim not to be directly involved in the conflict with Russia, while arming Ukraine to the tune of $200 billion.

Multiple Western outlets have reported that the limitations might be lifted this week, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Kiev. Russia has repeatedly warned the West against such a course of action.

 

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China makes its move in Africa. Should the West be worried?

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Beijing maintains a conservative economic agenda in its relations with the continent, while finding it increasingly difficult to avoid a political confrontation with the West

The ninth forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit held in Beijing on September 4-6 marked a significant phase in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-Covid era. China is the last major partner to hold a summit with African nations following the end of the pandemic; Africa summits were held by the EU and the US in 2022, and by Russia in 2023. The pandemic, coupled with rising global tensions, macroeconomic shifts, and a series of crises, underlined Africa’s growing role in the global economy and politics – something that China, which has undergone major changes (both internal and external) as a result of the pandemic, is well aware of.

It is clear that the relationship between China and Africa is entering a new phase. China is no longer just a preferential economic partner for Africa, as it had been in the first two decades of the 21st century. It has become a key political and military ally for many African countries. This is evident from China’s increasing role in training African civil servants and sharing expertise with them, as well as from several initiatives announced at the summit, including military-technical cooperation: officer training programs, mine clearing efforts, and over $100 million which China will provide to support the armed forces of African nations.

In the political arena, however, Beijing is proceeding very cautiously and the above-mentioned initiatives should be seen as the first tentative attempts rather than a systematic strategy.

While China strives to avoid political confrontation with the West in Africa and even closely cooperates with it on certain issues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. Washington is determined to pursue a policy of confrontation with Beijing in Africa – this is evident both from US rhetoric and its strategic documents.

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A “divorce” between China and the West is almost inevitable. This means that Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations and won’t have access to transportation and logistics infrastructure. Consequently, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global power centers.

An important sign of the growing confrontation between the US and China in Africa was the signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia regarding the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was originally built by China in the 1970s. If it is expanded, electrified, and modernized, TAZARA has the potential to become a viable alternative to one of the key US investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor, which aims to enhance logistics infrastructure for exporting minerals (copper and cobalt) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia by modernizing the railway from the DR Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In inland regions such as Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of mineral extraction. Considering the region’s shortage of rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway line leading to a port in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean can significantly boost the operation of the mining sector and permanently tie the extraction and processing regions to specific markets.

It appears that China’s initiative holds greater promise compared to the US one, particularly because Chinese companies control major mines both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This gives them a clear advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment, facilitating the export of minerals through East African ports. Overall, this indicates that East Africa will maintain its role as the economic leader on the continent and one of the most integrated and rapidly developing regions for imports.

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The highlight of the summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion to African countries over the next three years (by 2027). This figure echoes the $55 billion commitment to China made by the US (for 3 years) at the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion that the EU promised to provide over seven years back in 2021. Consequently, leading global players allocate approximately $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

In recent years, there has been noticeable growth in such promises. Nearly every nation is eager to promise Africa something – for example, Italy has pledged $1 billion annually. However, these large packages of so-called “financial aid” often have little in common with actual assistance, since they are typically commercial loans or corporate investments. Moreover, a significant portion of these funds is spent in the donor countries (e.g. on the procurement and production of goods), which means that they contribute to the economic growth of African nations in a minimal way.

As for China, it will provide about $11 billion in genuine aid. This is a substantial amount which will be used for developing healthcare and agriculture in Africa. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans (roughly $10 billion per year) and a further $10 billion as investments.

The overall financial framework allows us to make certain conclusions, though it’s important to note that the methodology for calculating these figures is unclear, and the line between loans, humanitarian aid, and investments remains blurred. In terms of investments (averaging around $3 billion per year), Beijing plans to maintain its previous levels of activity – in recent years, China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion annually. Financial and humanitarian aid could nearly double (from the current $1.5 billion-$2 billion per year) while lending is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels (which would still be below the peak years of 2012-2018).

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China’s economic plan for Africa seems to be quite conservative. It’s no surprise that debt issues took center stage during the summit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, macroeconomic stability in African countries deteriorated, which led to challenges in debt repayments and forced Africa to initiate debt restructuring processes assisted by the IMF and the G20. Starting in 2020, a combination of internal and external factors led China to significantly cut its lending to African countries – from about $10-15 billion down to $2-3 billion. This reduction in funding has triggered economic reforms in several African countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), which have shifted toward stricter tax and monetary policies. While promises to increase lending may seem like good news for African nations, it’s likely that much of this funding will go toward interest payments on existing obligations and debt restructuring, since China wants to ensure that its loans are repaid.

Despite China’s cautious approach to Africa, its interaction with the continent will develop as a result of external and internal changes affecting both Africa and China. Africa will gradually become more industrialized and will reduce imports while the demand for investments and local production will increase. China will face demographic challenges, and its workforce will decrease. This may encourage bilateral cooperation as some production facilities may move from China to Africa. This will most likely concern East African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, considering China’s current investments in their energy and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, with Africa’s population on the rise and China’s population declining, Beijing is expected to attract more African migrant workers to help address labor shortages.

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