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US-backed opposition in Venezuela is in freefall, have only themselves to blame

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Most people around the globe would agree that 2020 has been a year to forget. This is certainly, if not especially, true for Venezuela’s opposition, and the upcoming parliamentary vote will only add to their misfortunes.

A revolt from within the opposition ranks who sought the ouster of self-proclaimed ‘president’ Juan Guaido as head of the National Assembly set the tone in early January, with scandals and defections cascading month after month.

Among the most notable gaffes of course was the preposterous invasion failure in May that the hapless leader feverishly denied involvement in. A member of Guaido’s inner circle resigned from his ‘post’ after the ex-US Marine turned-mercenary who headed the operation produced a recorded phone conversation along with a multi-million contract of the plot bearing Guaido’s signature.

As this now infamous year winds down, things aren’t looking any better for the would-be leader and Co., given that they will almost certainly end up in political purgatory after votes are counted in the country’s legislative election on December 6.

‘I’ve never seen a contract for toppling a govt’: Venezuelan VP decries Guaido’s hiring of US mercenaries to Rafael Correa

The most likely result of the contest – the 26th election held in 21 years of the Bolivarian Revolution – is a victory for the Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV) led by Nicolas Maduro, who even promised to step down if the opposition wins.

A certain outcome however, is that Guaido and his US-backed coalition will be left without any representation in the National Assembly after the group opted to boycott the elections, claiming a lack of guarantees for free and fair elections.

Their allegations have been echoed by US officials and parrotted by some in the mainstream media, with others going as far as to cry fraud before any vote has actually taken place.

This isn’t the first time Venezuela’s opposition parties have disavowed election authorities and results. In fact, prominent sections of the opposition have attempted to levy fraud charges in every one of those over two dozen elections, with the exception of two – the 2007 constitutional referendum and the 2015 legislative elections, both of which were won by the opposition. Opposition forces also boycotted the elections in 2005 and the 2018 presidential vote.

As with all previous elections, the upcoming vote will involve more than 1,500 registered observers involving 200 international monitors and including academics and representatives from regional groups such the Puebla Group and CARICOM. Caracas had also asked the EU to send an observer group, but this offer wasn’t taken up.

Despite the boycott from Guaido’s allies, over 14,000 candidates from over 100 parties and organizations – almost all of them connected with opposition parties from the right and left not affiliated with Guaido – are vying for the 277 seats in the National Assembly.

With over two decades of history to look on, it is clear that there are no guarantees that would allow Venezuela’s opposition to participate in a vote let alone accept the result, other than a guarantee that they would be declared winners, of course.

But even if they had contested this vote, Guaido’s forces would have been unlikely to repeat their 2015 result, when they won nearly two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. If there is dissatisfaction within the ranks of Chavismo due to the ongoing woes with oil, goods and price speculation which have been exacerbated by Washington’s sanctions, there is equal or even greater disillusionment in the opposition camp given that Guaido has proven to be at least as ineffective as opposition leaders before him.

Venezuela is giving the US the middle finger by selling oil to China, as Trump has lost interest in regime change

The attempt by Maduro’s regional adversaries in Washington, Ottawa and elsewhere to crown Guaido as the country’s president was used to illegally seize Venezuelan state assets in the form of refineries, oil and gold, with the pretext of these administered by this parallel ‘government.’

Almost two years after the move and the opposition has once again fallen into the divisions and infighting that have characterized it throughout the last two decades, especially given the serious allegations of corruption and misuse of funds being administered by Guaido ‘officials.’ For his part, Guaido has been unable to wrestle control of any institution in the country, and is on the brink of definitively losing control of the only one they did control.

With his stock in freefall, Guaido’s allies continue to jump ship, while others are invariably maneuvering to take the wheel.

But with Guaido as its leader or no, 2021 could be even bleaker than this past year for Venezuela’s opposition. Not only will they lack representation in any of the country’s key institutions, effectively removing their arguments about being the only legitimate protectors of the constitution, but they also have a dwindling roster of allies in the region.

Bolivia will likely join Argentina and Mexico in not participating in the anti-Maduro initiatives at the so-called Lima Group, which hasn’t even been able to meet in Lima given the turmoil that has claimed two presidents in as many years. Ecuador looks poised to have its own political shift in 2021, leaving a handful of governments who are immersed in their own political and economic crises.

Importantly, there will also be a new administration in Washington, which will almost certainly continue to attempt to overthrow Maduro and the Bolivarian Revolution, but not in the same way as the outgoing government. The Biden White House (and Pentagon, and Langley) will have to reconcile that Guaido is not the President of Venezuela, nor is he a tenable option to lead a viable opposition.

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China is raising its retirement age, now among the youngest in the world’s major economies

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Starting next year, China will raise its retirement age for workers, which is now among the youngest in the world’s major economies, in an effort to address its shrinking population and aging work force.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature, passed the new policy Friday after a sudden announcement earlier in the week that it was reviewing the measure, state broadcaster CCTV announced.

The policy change will be carried out over 15 years, with the retirement age for men raised to 63 years, and for women to 55 or 58 years depending on their jobs. The current retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs and 55 for women doing white-collar work.

“We have more people coming into the retirement age, and so the pension fund is (facing) high pressure. That’s why I think it’s now time to act seriously,” said Xiujian Peng, a senior research fellow at Victoria University in Australia who studies China’s population and its ties to the economy.

The previous retirement ages were set in the 1950’s, when life expectancy was only around 40 years, Peng said.

The policy will be implemented starting in January, according to the announcement from China’s legislature. The change will take effect progressively based on people’s birthdates.

For example, a man born in January 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 7 months in August 2032, according to a chart released along with the policy. A man born in May 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 8 months in January 2033.

Demographic pressures made the move long overdue, experts say. By the end of 2023, China counted nearly 300 million people over the age of 60. By 2035, that figure is projected to be 400 million, larger than the population of the U.S. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had previously projected that the public pension fund will run out of money by that year.

Pressure on social benefits such as pensions and social security is hardly a China-specific problem. The U.S. also faces the issue as analysis shows that currently, the Social Security fund won’t be able to pay out full benefits to people by 2033.

“This is happening everywhere,” said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But in China with its large elderly population, the challenge is much larger.”

That is on top of fewer births, as younger people opt out of having children, citing high costs. In 2022, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for the first time the country had 850,000 fewer people at the end of the year than the previous year , a turning point from population growth to decline. In 2023, the population shrank further, by 2 million people.

What that means is that the burden of funding elderly people’s pensions will be divided among a smaller group of younger workers, as pension payments are largely funded by deductions from people who are currently working.

Researchers measure that pressure by looking at a number called the dependency ratio, which counts the number of people over the age of 65 compared to the number of workers under 65. That number was 21.8% in 2022, according to government statistics, meaning that roughly five workers would support one retiree. The percentage is expected to rise, meaning fewer workers will be shouldering the burden of one retiree.

The necessary course correction will cause short-term pain, experts say, coming at a time of already high youth unemployment and a soft economy.

A 52-year-old Beijing resident, who gave his family name as Lu and will now retire at age 61 instead of 60, was positive about the change. “I view this as a good thing, because our society’s getting older, and in developed countries, the retirement age is higher,” he said.

Li Bin, 35, who works in the event planning industry, said she was a bit sad.

“It’s three years less of play time. I had originally planned to travel around after retirement,” she said. But she said it was better than expected because the retirement age was only raised three years for women in white-collar jobs.

Some of the comments on social media when the policy review was announced earlier in the week reflected anxiety.

But of the 13,000 comments on the Xinhua news post announcing the news, only a few dozen were visible, suggesting that many others had been censored.

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Russia warns NATO of ‘direct war’ over Ukraine

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Moscow’s envoy to the UN has reiterated where the Kremlin’s red line is

Granting Kiev permission to use Western-supplied long-range weapons would constitute direct involvement in the Ukraine conflict by NATO, Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, has said.

Moscow will treat any such attack as coming from the US and its allies directly, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday, explaining that long-range weapons rely on Western intelligence and targeting solutions, neither of which Ukraine is capable of.

NATO countries would “start an open war” with Russia if they allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons, Nebenzia told the UN Security Council on Friday.

“If such a decision is made, that means NATO countries are starting an open war against Russia,” Moscow’s envoy said. “In that case, we will obviously be forced to make certain decisions, with all the attendant consequences for Western aggressors.”

Putin issues new warning to NATO

“Our Western colleagues will not be able to dodge responsibility and blame Kiev for everything,” Nebenzia added. “Only NATO troops can program the flight solutions for those missile systems. Ukraine doesn’t have that capability. This is not about allowing Kiev to strike Russia with long-range weapons, but about the West making the targeting decisions.”

Russia considers it irrelevant that Ukrainian nationalists would technically be the ones pulling the trigger, Nebenzia explained. “NATO would become directly involved in military action against a nuclear power. I don’t think I have to explain what consequences that would have,” he said.

The US and its allies placed some restrictions on the use of their weapons, so they could claim not to be directly involved in the conflict with Russia, while arming Ukraine to the tune of $200 billion.

Multiple Western outlets have reported that the limitations might be lifted this week, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Kiev. Russia has repeatedly warned the West against such a course of action.

 

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China makes its move in Africa. Should the West be worried?

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Beijing maintains a conservative economic agenda in its relations with the continent, while finding it increasingly difficult to avoid a political confrontation with the West

The ninth forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit held in Beijing on September 4-6 marked a significant phase in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-Covid era. China is the last major partner to hold a summit with African nations following the end of the pandemic; Africa summits were held by the EU and the US in 2022, and by Russia in 2023. The pandemic, coupled with rising global tensions, macroeconomic shifts, and a series of crises, underlined Africa’s growing role in the global economy and politics – something that China, which has undergone major changes (both internal and external) as a result of the pandemic, is well aware of.

It is clear that the relationship between China and Africa is entering a new phase. China is no longer just a preferential economic partner for Africa, as it had been in the first two decades of the 21st century. It has become a key political and military ally for many African countries. This is evident from China’s increasing role in training African civil servants and sharing expertise with them, as well as from several initiatives announced at the summit, including military-technical cooperation: officer training programs, mine clearing efforts, and over $100 million which China will provide to support the armed forces of African nations.

In the political arena, however, Beijing is proceeding very cautiously and the above-mentioned initiatives should be seen as the first tentative attempts rather than a systematic strategy.

While China strives to avoid political confrontation with the West in Africa and even closely cooperates with it on certain issues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. Washington is determined to pursue a policy of confrontation with Beijing in Africa – this is evident both from US rhetoric and its strategic documents.

Dirty tactics: How the US tries to break China’s soft power in Africa

A “divorce” between China and the West is almost inevitable. This means that Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations and won’t have access to transportation and logistics infrastructure. Consequently, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global power centers.

An important sign of the growing confrontation between the US and China in Africa was the signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia regarding the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was originally built by China in the 1970s. If it is expanded, electrified, and modernized, TAZARA has the potential to become a viable alternative to one of the key US investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor, which aims to enhance logistics infrastructure for exporting minerals (copper and cobalt) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia by modernizing the railway from the DR Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In inland regions such as Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of mineral extraction. Considering the region’s shortage of rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway line leading to a port in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean can significantly boost the operation of the mining sector and permanently tie the extraction and processing regions to specific markets.

It appears that China’s initiative holds greater promise compared to the US one, particularly because Chinese companies control major mines both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This gives them a clear advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment, facilitating the export of minerals through East African ports. Overall, this indicates that East Africa will maintain its role as the economic leader on the continent and one of the most integrated and rapidly developing regions for imports.

A former colonial European power returns to Africa. What is it after now?

The highlight of the summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion to African countries over the next three years (by 2027). This figure echoes the $55 billion commitment to China made by the US (for 3 years) at the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion that the EU promised to provide over seven years back in 2021. Consequently, leading global players allocate approximately $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

In recent years, there has been noticeable growth in such promises. Nearly every nation is eager to promise Africa something – for example, Italy has pledged $1 billion annually. However, these large packages of so-called “financial aid” often have little in common with actual assistance, since they are typically commercial loans or corporate investments. Moreover, a significant portion of these funds is spent in the donor countries (e.g. on the procurement and production of goods), which means that they contribute to the economic growth of African nations in a minimal way.

As for China, it will provide about $11 billion in genuine aid. This is a substantial amount which will be used for developing healthcare and agriculture in Africa. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans (roughly $10 billion per year) and a further $10 billion as investments.

The overall financial framework allows us to make certain conclusions, though it’s important to note that the methodology for calculating these figures is unclear, and the line between loans, humanitarian aid, and investments remains blurred. In terms of investments (averaging around $3 billion per year), Beijing plans to maintain its previous levels of activity – in recent years, China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion annually. Financial and humanitarian aid could nearly double (from the current $1.5 billion-$2 billion per year) while lending is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels (which would still be below the peak years of 2012-2018).

Can Africa seize control of its own energy?

China’s economic plan for Africa seems to be quite conservative. It’s no surprise that debt issues took center stage during the summit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, macroeconomic stability in African countries deteriorated, which led to challenges in debt repayments and forced Africa to initiate debt restructuring processes assisted by the IMF and the G20. Starting in 2020, a combination of internal and external factors led China to significantly cut its lending to African countries – from about $10-15 billion down to $2-3 billion. This reduction in funding has triggered economic reforms in several African countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), which have shifted toward stricter tax and monetary policies. While promises to increase lending may seem like good news for African nations, it’s likely that much of this funding will go toward interest payments on existing obligations and debt restructuring, since China wants to ensure that its loans are repaid.

Despite China’s cautious approach to Africa, its interaction with the continent will develop as a result of external and internal changes affecting both Africa and China. Africa will gradually become more industrialized and will reduce imports while the demand for investments and local production will increase. China will face demographic challenges, and its workforce will decrease. This may encourage bilateral cooperation as some production facilities may move from China to Africa. This will most likely concern East African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, considering China’s current investments in their energy and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, with Africa’s population on the rise and China’s population declining, Beijing is expected to attract more African migrant workers to help address labor shortages.

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