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Israel’s gift to Joe Biden, 52 days before he even takes office: war with Iran.

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The assassination of Tehran’s top nuclear scientist is a ploy by Israel to compel the likely US president-elect to reject diplomacy and choose military action to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambition. Which option will he choose?

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was the shadowy father of Iran’s nuclear program; his existence, let alone his work, was barely acknowledged by Iran. A brigadier general with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Command, Fakhrizadeh was involved in the academic aspects of Iranian national security, eventually heading up the Physics Research Center, where he masterminded the design and material acquisition in support of Iran’s uranium enrichment effort.

In April 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu named Fakhrizadeh as the head of a covert military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, something Iran has vociferously denied. On Friday, November 28, 2020, the 62-year-old scientist was assassinated just outside the Iranian capital of Tehran. While no one has taken credit for his murder, Iran has placed the blame for his death squarely on Israel.

At the time of his death, Fakhrizadeh was the head of the Research and Innovation Organization (RIO), part of the Iranian Defense Ministry. A June 2020 report on nonproliferation published by the US Department of State alleged that Fakhrizadeh used the RIO “to keep former weapons program scientists employed … on [nuclear] weaponization-relevant dual-use technical activities … to aid in any future nuclear weapons development work in the event that a decision were made to resume such work.”

Iranian president points finger at Israel after assassination of top military scientist near Tehran

This belief, when combined with Iran’s decision to cease abiding by the provisions of the landmark 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, better known as the Iran nuclear agreement) regarding the stockpiling of low-enriched uranium and the use of advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium, had the de facto effect of signing Fakhrizadeh’s death warrant.

The JCPOA-imposed restrictions were designed with a one-year ‘breakout’ scenario in mind – in short, the time it would take Iran to produce enough highly enriched uranium to create a single nuclear device once the decision was made to cease adhering to restrictions on the numbers and types of centrifuges it could operate, the level of enrichment permitted, and the amount of low-enriched uranium allowed to be stockpiled.

In May 2019 – one year after President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA – Iran began pulling back from its commitments under the agreement, citing its right to do so under Articles 26 and 36 of the deal, which allow a party to the agreement to cease its obligations if another party is found to be in noncompliance; Iran maintains that the failure of Europe to live up to its economic commitments under the JCPOA constituted demonstrable noncompliance. The end result is that today the ‘breakout’ period has shrunk to a few weeks.

For the Trump administration, Iran’s noncompliance with the JCPOA had placed it in a quandary; the policy of sanctions-based ‘maximum pressure’ which had been instituted since 2018 was clearly not working when it came to the goal of compelling Iran to return to the negotiation table and hammer out a new, more restrictive nuclear deal.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei pledges to ‘firmly prosecute’ those behind assassination of top military scientist

Having gone on record regarding its belief that Iran continued to maintain covert nuclear weapons ambitions, the Trump administration was confronted with the reality that it had, according to its own beliefs, empowered Iran to produce a nuclear weapon in a time frame that posed a direct threat to the US and its regional allies, in particular Israel and Saudi Arabia. This concern was behind recent press reports that President Trump was considering military options against Iran’s nuclear program.

For Israel, the issues are even more acute; whereas Iran’s potential acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would pose a policy conundrum for the US, for Israel an Iranian nuclear weapon would represent an existential threat. For this reason, Israel has historically pulled few punches when it comes to confronting even the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.

While much of the intelligence underpinning the US and Israeli assessments regarding the existence of a nuclear weapons program are derived from sources of questionable provenance and are not conclusive, Israel has taken an absolutist posture; it’s given credence to sources that otherwise might be consigned to the bottom drawer.

In its effort to win support for this position, Israel has exaggerated – even fabricated – intelligence on Iran, undermining its credibility to such an extent that, when Israel reported that its intelligence stole a nuclear archive from Iran in early 2018, the veracity of this claim was called into question after documents previously held to have been forged were claimed to be part of the document trove.

‘Important to preserve scope for talks with Iran’: Germany warns against escalation after killing of top Iranian scientist

Israel’s actions against Iran’s nuclear program have been anything but passive; in 2009-2010, Israel worked with US intelligence to launch a cyberattack using the Stuxnet virus to infect Iranian centrifuge operations at Natanz. This was followed by a program of targeted assassinations which killed four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010-2012 (a fifth attack narrowly missed killing the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization).

Israeli intelligence is also said to be behind a series of mysterious explosions at Iranian nuclear-related facilities earlier this year which caused significant damage and disruption to Iran’s centrifuge program. While Israel has not taken responsibility for the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, his murder can logically be viewed as a continuation of Israel’s efforts to degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Joe Biden is no stranger to the active measures taken by Israel in this regard. As vice president, he sat in on critical meetings regarding the deployment of the Stuxnet virus. He was fully cognizant of the pressure being placed on President Obama regarding military action against Iran, and understood the role played by the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists in ratcheting this pressure up.

Jake Sullivan, who served as Biden’s national security advisor while he was vice president, played a critical role in the early negotiations with Iran that made the JCPOA possible. Biden knew full well that the JCPOA was a diplomatic off-ramp for a policy path that otherwise would have led to war. Biden is intimately familiar with the calculations behind the ‘breakout’ timelines, and the decision that was made to de-emphasize the concern over Iran’s alleged military interest in nuclear weapons.

The assassination of Fakhrizadeh is a calculated act on the part of Israel. His death has no real impact on Iran’s nuclear activities – a new generation of Iranian scientists has long since been educated, trained and employed in a program that is far more advanced and mature than the one Fakhrizadeh started more than 20 years ago. Psychologically, however, his murder – carried out in broad daylight in the heart of Iran – has dealt a psychological blow to Tehran’s leadership, once again proving that the long arm of Israeli intelligence can get to just about anyone.

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But its most critical impact is the effect it will have on the national security team surrounding presumed President-elect Joe Biden. Biden and his team have been paying lip service to the notion of rejoining the JCPOA. However, the preconditions they have attached to such an action – Iran would have to return to full compliance first, and commit to immediate follow-on negotiations on a deal that would be more restrictive – were widely seen as a deal breaker. The fact is, many of Biden’s closest advisers – including Secretary of State-designee Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor-designee Jake Sullivan – have indicated that Biden may have no choice but to continue the Trump policy of sanctions-based ‘maximum pressure’.

For Israel, such a policy – while an improvement over rejoining the JCPOA – is not acceptable. From its perspective, ‘maximum pressure’ has not only failed to compel Iran to the negotiation table, but has also positioned Iran to be on the cusp of developing a nuclear weapons capability.

The assassination of Fakhrizadeh serves two main purposes. First, it hardens the resolve of Iran when it comes to any potential flexibility it might have been prepared to have with Biden regarding a resolution to the nuclear standoff, with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei directing Iranian scientists “[t]o follow up Martyr Fakhrizadeh’s scientific and technical activities in all fields in which he was active.” The idea that Iran would seek to compromise with the US in the aftermath of Fakhrizadeh’s murder is, to put it bluntly, absurd.

But the most important purpose behind the killing of Fakhrizadeh is to create a fait accompli when it comes to policy options being considered by a future Biden administration. Rejoining the JCPOA is likely a non-starter – Iran will never agree to the many preconditions sought by Biden and his advisers.

Likewise, continuing Trump’s program of ‘maximum pressure’ is not a politically viable option, given the advanced state of the Iranian nuclear program and the impact this has on the all-important ‘breakout window’ that underpinned, from the US perspective, the legitimacy of the JCPOA. The same contingencies being confronted by the Trump administration regarding the possibility of US forces attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will be confronted by President Biden on his first day in office. By killing Fakhrizadeh, Israel is doing its best to ensure that, for Biden, that military action is the only viable option available.

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China is raising its retirement age, now among the youngest in the world’s major economies

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Starting next year, China will raise its retirement age for workers, which is now among the youngest in the world’s major economies, in an effort to address its shrinking population and aging work force.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the country’s legislature, passed the new policy Friday after a sudden announcement earlier in the week that it was reviewing the measure, state broadcaster CCTV announced.

The policy change will be carried out over 15 years, with the retirement age for men raised to 63 years, and for women to 55 or 58 years depending on their jobs. The current retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs and 55 for women doing white-collar work.

“We have more people coming into the retirement age, and so the pension fund is (facing) high pressure. That’s why I think it’s now time to act seriously,” said Xiujian Peng, a senior research fellow at Victoria University in Australia who studies China’s population and its ties to the economy.

The previous retirement ages were set in the 1950’s, when life expectancy was only around 40 years, Peng said.

The policy will be implemented starting in January, according to the announcement from China’s legislature. The change will take effect progressively based on people’s birthdates.

For example, a man born in January 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 7 months in August 2032, according to a chart released along with the policy. A man born in May 1971 could retire at the age of 61 years and 8 months in January 2033.

Demographic pressures made the move long overdue, experts say. By the end of 2023, China counted nearly 300 million people over the age of 60. By 2035, that figure is projected to be 400 million, larger than the population of the U.S. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had previously projected that the public pension fund will run out of money by that year.

Pressure on social benefits such as pensions and social security is hardly a China-specific problem. The U.S. also faces the issue as analysis shows that currently, the Social Security fund won’t be able to pay out full benefits to people by 2033.

“This is happening everywhere,” said Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. “But in China with its large elderly population, the challenge is much larger.”

That is on top of fewer births, as younger people opt out of having children, citing high costs. In 2022, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for the first time the country had 850,000 fewer people at the end of the year than the previous year , a turning point from population growth to decline. In 2023, the population shrank further, by 2 million people.

What that means is that the burden of funding elderly people’s pensions will be divided among a smaller group of younger workers, as pension payments are largely funded by deductions from people who are currently working.

Researchers measure that pressure by looking at a number called the dependency ratio, which counts the number of people over the age of 65 compared to the number of workers under 65. That number was 21.8% in 2022, according to government statistics, meaning that roughly five workers would support one retiree. The percentage is expected to rise, meaning fewer workers will be shouldering the burden of one retiree.

The necessary course correction will cause short-term pain, experts say, coming at a time of already high youth unemployment and a soft economy.

A 52-year-old Beijing resident, who gave his family name as Lu and will now retire at age 61 instead of 60, was positive about the change. “I view this as a good thing, because our society’s getting older, and in developed countries, the retirement age is higher,” he said.

Li Bin, 35, who works in the event planning industry, said she was a bit sad.

“It’s three years less of play time. I had originally planned to travel around after retirement,” she said. But she said it was better than expected because the retirement age was only raised three years for women in white-collar jobs.

Some of the comments on social media when the policy review was announced earlier in the week reflected anxiety.

But of the 13,000 comments on the Xinhua news post announcing the news, only a few dozen were visible, suggesting that many others had been censored.

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Russia warns NATO of ‘direct war’ over Ukraine

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Moscow’s envoy to the UN has reiterated where the Kremlin’s red line is

Granting Kiev permission to use Western-supplied long-range weapons would constitute direct involvement in the Ukraine conflict by NATO, Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, has said.

Moscow will treat any such attack as coming from the US and its allies directly, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday, explaining that long-range weapons rely on Western intelligence and targeting solutions, neither of which Ukraine is capable of.

NATO countries would “start an open war” with Russia if they allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons, Nebenzia told the UN Security Council on Friday.

“If such a decision is made, that means NATO countries are starting an open war against Russia,” Moscow’s envoy said. “In that case, we will obviously be forced to make certain decisions, with all the attendant consequences for Western aggressors.”

Putin issues new warning to NATO

“Our Western colleagues will not be able to dodge responsibility and blame Kiev for everything,” Nebenzia added. “Only NATO troops can program the flight solutions for those missile systems. Ukraine doesn’t have that capability. This is not about allowing Kiev to strike Russia with long-range weapons, but about the West making the targeting decisions.”

Russia considers it irrelevant that Ukrainian nationalists would technically be the ones pulling the trigger, Nebenzia explained. “NATO would become directly involved in military action against a nuclear power. I don’t think I have to explain what consequences that would have,” he said.

The US and its allies placed some restrictions on the use of their weapons, so they could claim not to be directly involved in the conflict with Russia, while arming Ukraine to the tune of $200 billion.

Multiple Western outlets have reported that the limitations might be lifted this week, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Kiev. Russia has repeatedly warned the West against such a course of action.

 

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China makes its move in Africa. Should the West be worried?

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Beijing maintains a conservative economic agenda in its relations with the continent, while finding it increasingly difficult to avoid a political confrontation with the West

The ninth forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit held in Beijing on September 4-6 marked a significant phase in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-Covid era. China is the last major partner to hold a summit with African nations following the end of the pandemic; Africa summits were held by the EU and the US in 2022, and by Russia in 2023. The pandemic, coupled with rising global tensions, macroeconomic shifts, and a series of crises, underlined Africa’s growing role in the global economy and politics – something that China, which has undergone major changes (both internal and external) as a result of the pandemic, is well aware of.

It is clear that the relationship between China and Africa is entering a new phase. China is no longer just a preferential economic partner for Africa, as it had been in the first two decades of the 21st century. It has become a key political and military ally for many African countries. This is evident from China’s increasing role in training African civil servants and sharing expertise with them, as well as from several initiatives announced at the summit, including military-technical cooperation: officer training programs, mine clearing efforts, and over $100 million which China will provide to support the armed forces of African nations.

In the political arena, however, Beijing is proceeding very cautiously and the above-mentioned initiatives should be seen as the first tentative attempts rather than a systematic strategy.

While China strives to avoid political confrontation with the West in Africa and even closely cooperates with it on certain issues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. Washington is determined to pursue a policy of confrontation with Beijing in Africa – this is evident both from US rhetoric and its strategic documents.

Dirty tactics: How the US tries to break China’s soft power in Africa

A “divorce” between China and the West is almost inevitable. This means that Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations and won’t have access to transportation and logistics infrastructure. Consequently, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global power centers.

An important sign of the growing confrontation between the US and China in Africa was the signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia regarding the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which was originally built by China in the 1970s. If it is expanded, electrified, and modernized, TAZARA has the potential to become a viable alternative to one of the key US investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor, which aims to enhance logistics infrastructure for exporting minerals (copper and cobalt) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia by modernizing the railway from the DR Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In inland regions such as Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a crucial role in the process of mineral extraction. Considering the region’s shortage of rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway line leading to a port in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean can significantly boost the operation of the mining sector and permanently tie the extraction and processing regions to specific markets.

It appears that China’s initiative holds greater promise compared to the US one, particularly because Chinese companies control major mines both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. This gives them a clear advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment, facilitating the export of minerals through East African ports. Overall, this indicates that East Africa will maintain its role as the economic leader on the continent and one of the most integrated and rapidly developing regions for imports.

A former colonial European power returns to Africa. What is it after now?

The highlight of the summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion to African countries over the next three years (by 2027). This figure echoes the $55 billion commitment to China made by the US (for 3 years) at the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion that the EU promised to provide over seven years back in 2021. Consequently, leading global players allocate approximately $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

In recent years, there has been noticeable growth in such promises. Nearly every nation is eager to promise Africa something – for example, Italy has pledged $1 billion annually. However, these large packages of so-called “financial aid” often have little in common with actual assistance, since they are typically commercial loans or corporate investments. Moreover, a significant portion of these funds is spent in the donor countries (e.g. on the procurement and production of goods), which means that they contribute to the economic growth of African nations in a minimal way.

As for China, it will provide about $11 billion in genuine aid. This is a substantial amount which will be used for developing healthcare and agriculture in Africa. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans (roughly $10 billion per year) and a further $10 billion as investments.

The overall financial framework allows us to make certain conclusions, though it’s important to note that the methodology for calculating these figures is unclear, and the line between loans, humanitarian aid, and investments remains blurred. In terms of investments (averaging around $3 billion per year), Beijing plans to maintain its previous levels of activity – in recent years, China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) have ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion annually. Financial and humanitarian aid could nearly double (from the current $1.5 billion-$2 billion per year) while lending is expected to return to pre-pandemic levels (which would still be below the peak years of 2012-2018).

Can Africa seize control of its own energy?

China’s economic plan for Africa seems to be quite conservative. It’s no surprise that debt issues took center stage during the summit. During the Covid-19 pandemic, macroeconomic stability in African countries deteriorated, which led to challenges in debt repayments and forced Africa to initiate debt restructuring processes assisted by the IMF and the G20. Starting in 2020, a combination of internal and external factors led China to significantly cut its lending to African countries – from about $10-15 billion down to $2-3 billion. This reduction in funding has triggered economic reforms in several African countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria), which have shifted toward stricter tax and monetary policies. While promises to increase lending may seem like good news for African nations, it’s likely that much of this funding will go toward interest payments on existing obligations and debt restructuring, since China wants to ensure that its loans are repaid.

Despite China’s cautious approach to Africa, its interaction with the continent will develop as a result of external and internal changes affecting both Africa and China. Africa will gradually become more industrialized and will reduce imports while the demand for investments and local production will increase. China will face demographic challenges, and its workforce will decrease. This may encourage bilateral cooperation as some production facilities may move from China to Africa. This will most likely concern East African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, considering China’s current investments in their energy and transportation infrastructure. Additionally, with Africa’s population on the rise and China’s population declining, Beijing is expected to attract more African migrant workers to help address labor shortages.

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